« "Since PGP keys aren't designed for humans, you need to move them electronically. But of course humans still need to verify the authenticity of received keys, as accepting an attacker-provided public key can be catastrophic," Green said. "PGP addresses this with a hodgepodge of key servers and public key fingerprints. These components respectively provide (untrustworthy) data transfer and a short token that human beings can manually verify. While in theory this is sound, in practice it adds complexity, which is always the enemy of security." »
=> Quel système en remplacement ? Il faut bien un ID garanti unique sans serveur central d'où un espace "de nommage" très grand. Associer un nom/label/identité à un nombre / une propriété mathématique sera toujours compliqué, àmha.

« According to the cryptographer, another issue is with manual PGP key management and the lack of transparency. »
=> Ouais, c'est mieux que la gestion des clés soit effectuée par Google/Yahoo/autre prestataire centralisé, c'est sûr. Non mais sérieusement ...

« The lack of forward secrecy, old cryptography and "bad" defaults have also been named as problematic by the expert. But the worst part of the PGP ecosystem, according to Green, are mail client implementations. »
=> +1 globalement. Concernant PFS, quel algo implémenter pour générer une clé de session alors que la communication est asynchrone (ce qui n'est pas le cas avec TLS et les algos (EC)DHE).

« "Many PGP-enabled mail clients make it ridiculously easy to send confidential messages with encryption turned off, to send unimportant messages with encryption turned on, to accidentally send to the wrong person's key (or the wrong subkey within a given person's key)," Green said. "They demand you encrypt your key with a passphrase, but routinely bug you to enter that passphrase in order to sign outgoing mail -- exposing your decryption keys in memory even when you're not reading secure email."

[...]

"The flaw is that many systems are old and not up-to-date and thus use poorly implemented or outdated versions of the standards," Morten Landrock, managing director at Denmark-based security solutions provider Cryptomathic Ltd., told SecurityWeek. »
=> +1, c'est un problème clé. Snowden (et d'autres comme Schneier) nous a bien indiqué que seule la cryptographie bien implémentée ET bien utilisée apporte une protection même contre des "ennemis" redoutables et puissants.

« Some agree with Green's views, but others, like Thomas H. Ptacek, a security researcher with Matasano Security, noted that while there is a lot wrong with PGP, it's currently the only trustworthy mainstream cryptosystem. »
=> +1, OpenPGP est le mieux dont on dispose actuellement. Ça ne veut pas dire qu'on ne peut rien améliorer, juste il faut passer du constat à l'implémentation de la solution au problème constaté et ça, c'est tout de suite moins facile.

Via http://shaarli.cafai.fr/?44vq6w